Recent restrictions on the patentability of human embryonic stem cell inventions in Europe necessitate a shift in R&D strategies.
T he patentability of inventions on human embryonic stem cells (hESCs) has been recently restricted both by the European Patent Office (EPO) and the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). Although they are not bound together as they rely on two separate organizations (the European Patent Organization and the European Union, respectively), their decisions have provided a uniform exclusion of patents on hESCs obtained through the destruction of human embryos ( Table 1) .
In November 2008, the Enlarged Board of Appeal of the EPO used the precedent of the nonpatentability of inventions using human embryos for industrial or commercial purposes in Europe to deny the hESC patent application of the Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation (WARF) 1 . However, the Board left open the possibility of patenting products and methods using hESCs available in biobanks because they were derived from cell lines 2 . Then in October 2011, in Brüstle v. Greenpeace 3 , the CJEU broadly interpreted the patent's exclusion of human embryos for use in commercial or industrial purposes. First, it defined the notion of human embryo as "any human ovum after fertilization, any nonfertilized human ovum into which the cell nucleus from a mature human cell has been transplanted and any nonfertilized human ovum whose division and further development have been stimulated by parthenogenesis. " Second, it excluded from patentability an invention where the technical teaching of the patent application requires the prior destruction of human embryos or their use as base material, whenever such destruction takes place and even if the claims' description does not refer to the use of human embryos. Most scientists in the field of hESC research have been worried by the Brüstle case as it prohibits hESC patents that could be obtained in the United States or Asia 4 .
Technion solidifies exclusion from patentability On February 4, 2014, the Technical Board of Appeal of the EPO stepped away from the Enlarged Board of Appeal's prior decision in the WARF 1 case, deciding instead to align itself with the CJEU's decision in Brüstle. The Israelbased Technion Research and Development Foundation (Israel being neither part of the European Patent Organization nor part of the EU) had applied to obtain a European patent on a cell culture comprising both human foreskin cells and hESCs as well as on methods of maintaining hESCs in an undifferentiated state. The patent was refused by the EPO's examining division because hESC lines used to carry out the invention were not publicly available at the filing date of application. Technion appealed; however, the Technical Board had to consider that the only possibility to obtain the hESCs necessary to realize the claimed method relied on the destruction of human embryos. It decided to maintain the patent's refusal on the basis of the necessary prior destruction of human embryos to establish the cell lines 5 .
The two main arguments used by Technion were rejected by the Technical Board. On the one hand, it was not possible for Technion to pass through the door left open in the WARF case-using methods based on commercially or otherwise publicly available hESC lines that do not involve de novo destruction of human embryos does not prevent the exclusion from patentability. Indeed, although the Technical Board examined the cell lines Technion claimed to be publicly available at the date of application, the lines all resulted from the initial destruction of human embryos, having been derived from the inner cell mass of the blastocyst. The Board also noted that there was no evidence on file proving that the hESC lines allegedly available from the US National Institutes of Health were obtained by methods that did not involve the destruction of human embryos.
On the other hand, the Board considered the argument of a too-wide exclusion because of the consideration of all the steps before an invention irrelevant, as in the WARF case. Indeed, the invention has to be viewed globally without distinguishing the persons who carried out different steps of the invention (the inventor or any other person) or points in time of the different steps resulting in the invention at stake. In such a context, the Technical Board in Technion considered that all steps preceding the invention were "a necessary precondition for carrying out the claimed invention" 5 .
Thus, the exclusion from patentability is considered extensively in Technion, which is in line with the CJEU's ruling in Brüstle, while closing the door left opened by the WARF case. Indeed, Technion excluded from patentability "inventions which make use P AT E N T S npg of [hESC] obtained by de novo destruction of human embryos or of publicly available hESC lines which were initially derived by a process resulting in the destruction of the human embryo." Now, the patentability of hESCs in European patent law is more uniform with both the EPO and the EU in harmony 6 . For European patents under the European Patent Convention, and for national patents within the EU member states that have to implement the Brüstle case, hESC technologies will not be patentable if the hESCs used were obtained from the destruction of human embryos, no matter when such destruction took place.
Impact on hESC research pathways Brüstle 7 and Technion 5 will have an impact on the organization of hESC innovation pathways as the effects of the decisions spread to Europe beyond the EU member states. The possible positive or negative influences on hESC research are shown in Table 2 . Regarding hESC research financing, the fear of diminution of private investment 8 pluripotent stem cells (iPSCs) provide new patent possibilities.
Reorganization of R&D strategies
The exclusion from patentability of hESC lines that have been obtained through the destruction of human embryos, no matter when such destruction took place, is now a certainty in Europe, being based on two distinct legal frameworks-namely the CJEU (Brüstle) and EPO (Technion) decisions. It can be considered as having an ethical basis, rather than a technical one. A similar ethical barrier to patentability was also seen in the US Supreme Court's 2013 decision in Myriad, which excluded from patentability naturally occurring DNA segments, even when isolated in the laboratory 14 . In determining patentability, courts seem to have drawn a line between research to generate knowledge and patents that are intended to generate commercial activities.
It is now realistic to consider that most of the hESC lines currently available cannot be used to obtain patents in Europe. To obtain a patent in the field of hESC, researchers will can be mitigated by the fact that fundamental research should not be directly affected by decisions related to patenting, being mainly funded by public institutions. It should be noted that since 2006, the EU does not fund research activities that destroy human embryos, including for the procurement of stem cells, although it funds the subsequent steps involving hESCs 9 . It has been argued that researchers, whose career advancement relies partly on patents obtained, will move to more liberal countries where financing for hESC research is available 10 . However, this may also occur elsewhere, as scientists from the United States and Asia move to Europe to escape restrictive patent regimes 11 . The exclusion from patentability may also delay the commercialization of cell therapies based on hESCs 4, 8 , or it may have little impact 7 in this area.
Finally, current and future technological developments may limit the impact of these legal decisions 12 as it is increasingly possible to obtain patents where hESCs are obtained without embryo destruction 13 and induced have to use hESC lines derived without the destruction of human embryos, or iPSC lines, although the equivalence between the two sources has not been established. To this end, it could be recommended to hESC repositories to clearly address the techniques used for obtaining cell lines and to make this information available to researchers. Another possibility could be to require this information to be systematically described, as a standard, in the European hESC registry. However, if using hESC lines derived without destruction of human embryos avoids the ethical problem of the destruction of potential human beings, it does not solve the problem of using embryos for commercial and industrial purposes. The commercialization of the human body is a major issue, and specifically sensitive when embryos are at stake; hence one reason the derivation of iPSC lines is being widely explored. If focusing on iPSCs while using hESCs as a gold standard brings conclusive results for medical applications, legal decisions on the nonpatentability of hESCs from destroyed embryos will have fewer consequences on innovation. If not, incentives for hESCs could be reopened through patents, based on utilitarian reasoning and patient benefit otherwise unattainable. In any case, both strategies will take years of research. Thus, hESC research toward innovation faces a
